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ABSTRACT 
Children's information processing of risky choice alternatives was 
investigated in two studies without using verbal reports. In Study 1, the ability 
to integrate the probabilities and the payoffs of simple bets was examined 
using the rating scale methodology. Children's choices among three of those 
simple bets were recorded also. By cross-classifying the children's choice and 
rating behavior it was shown that a three-stage developmental hypothesis of 
decision making is not sufficient. A four-stage hypothesis is proposed. 
In Study 2, the influence of enlarging the presented number of alternatives 
from two to three and the influence of the similarity of the alternatives on 
children's choice probabilities was examined with those bets. Children's 
choice behavior was probabilistic and was influenced only by enlarging the 
presented number of alternatives. These results suggest that a Bayesian 
approach, based on two probabilistic choice models, should not be applied in 
order to analyze children's choice behavior. The functional measurement 
approach is, as was demonstrated in Study 1, a powerful implement to further 
the understanding of the development of decision making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with children's information processing when they 
make decisions among conflicting alternatives. Developmental studies may 
contribute generally to the understanding of decision making in human 
beings. This developmental approach to decision making is a research 
strategy that avoids various difficulties with the common strategy of 
comparing human behavior with normative or statistically optimal decision 
theories. 
Schmidt (1966) adopted this point of view in a study of children's 
information processing when they made risky decisions among five 
alternatives. Each alternative consisted of a box into which 10 marbles of two 
colors (blue and yellow) were placed. The subjects were told that they would 
receive a specified amount of money or candy if they got a blue marble in a 
blind draw. The number of the blue marbles and the magnitude of the prize 
inversely varied across the alternatives. Thus, no alternative "dominated" 
another (see, e.g., Table 4.3 later). 
Schmidt found three stages of choice behavior with this task. The youngest 
children, 4 and 6 years in age, chose most often the alternative with the highest 
payoff; 8-year-old children chose the alternative with the highest probability 
of winning, while the II-year-olds chose the alternatives with medium payoffs 
and probabilities. To investigate the information processing of these three 
stages of choice behavior more closely, Schmidt asked the children for 
retrospective explanations of their choices. He concluded that the youngest 
children paid attention only to the payoff, that children at the second level 
considered only the probability, and that children at the third level took both 
attributes into account. 
The main argument against these conclusions is that Schmidt relied too 
much on the validity of the children's explanations of their choices. These 
explanations have questionable value because they depend on verbal skills 
that may portray only part of the process. Also, only the older children may 
have the conceptional and verbal abilities for more detailed answers. In 
addition, some authors (Kleber, 1970; Hommers & Gloth, 1978) havefound a 
high percentage of verbal explanations that cannot be attributed to any of the 
three levels. In order to analyze children's information processing of risky 
choices, other approaches using nonverbal techniques may be necessary. 
Nonverbal techniques were used by the present author (Hommers, 1975, 
1976) to analyze the information processing of the third level children more 
carefully. Among other results, it was found that third level children chose the 
largest expected value of the alternatives more likely than could be expected. 
Because the expected value of these alternatives is defined as the product of 
probability and payoff, this result supports the hypothesis of a mUltiplying 
rule applied by the third level children. However, similar studies have not 
been done for the first two stages. 
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STUDY 1 
Problem 
The hypothesis of Schmidt (1966), that subjects in the first or second stage 
base their decisions on either the payoff or on the probability and do not 
combine these two attributes, is questioned here. The functional 
measurement approach of information integration theory may be able to 
determine whether younger children can integrate these two attributes. 
Anderson and Shanteau (1970) found additive and multiplicative 
combination rules for single and duplex bets with adult subjects. However, a 
similar study with children has not been made. One advantage of the 
functional measurement approach is that it allows statistical analysis for the 
individual child. Such individual analysis is a necessity to avoid artifacts that 
can arise from pooling data over children who have different strategies. 
Method 
A 3 x 3, probability x payoff stimuli design was employed. The probability 
levels .10, .50, and .90 and the payoff levels 5, 25, and 45 Deutsche Pfennigs 
were used. Two replications of the nine stimuli from the design were given. In 
each replication the nine stimuli followed in a different order. Forty-two 
children (24 male; age 5-10 to 13-10) were tested in single sessions at their 
homes. 
On each trial, a colored picture of a bag was shown that contained 10 
marbles, some red, some green. The number of red marbles (1,5,9) indicated 
the probability of winning. Below the bag, yellow coins were seen that 
represented the prize (5, 25, or 45 Pfennigs). The children were told that 
picking a red marble in a blind draw would win the prize. Before drawing, 
however, the experimenter wanted to learn how much they liked each bet. 
To indicate their liking of each bet, the children used a graphic rating scale 
of 20 small circles, each 1 cm in diameter. At the left end of the scale a 
frowning face was shown. At the right end a smiling face was shown. Anchors 
were placed at each end of the scale. The upper anchor consisted of a bag with 
10 red marbles and a prize of 50 Deutsche Pfennigs. The lower anchor showed 
a bag with 10 green marbles and no coins. 
After the instructions, six practice stimuli were presented to train the 
children in the use of the scale. Following this, the two replications of the 
main design were given. 
Finally, the children chose one alternative from each of 10 three-alternative 
decision tasks. Before they chose, they had been introduced to all 10 tasks in 
order to avoid artificial risk tendencies. All 10 tasks had the inverse 
arrangement of probabilities and amounts of win, but varied in the specific 
values of these attributes. The first of the decision tasks had the alternatives 
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with the highest, lowest, and medium payoff of Schmidt's (1966) study and 
will be considered later. Payoffs were given immediately so that choices in 
later tasks that might be influenced by the gains or no-gains were not 
considered. 
Results 
The main purpose of the data analysis was to relate the rating data to the 
choice data in order to obtain behavioral evidence on the three stages 
considered previously. The first step was to calculate an analysis of variance 
separately for each individual subject. The main effects in this analysis 
provide a sensitive index of the child's utilization of the two stimulus cues in 
the factorial design. 
Raw data for three illustrative children are shown in Table 4.1, and the 
corresponding analyses of variance are summarized in Table 4.2. 
The child in the first row of Table 4.1 employed a payoff-only response 
strategy. His responses vary markedly as a fuction of the amount to be won, 
but are independent of the probabilities. This one-dimensional, payoff-only 
strategy reappears in the analysis of variance of Table 4.2: The mean square 
for payoff is very large compared to the error mean square, showing a highly 
significant payoff effect, while the probability effect does not approach 
significance. 
The second row of Table 4.1 shows a probability-only response strategy. 
The responses of this child vary markedly as a function of the probabilities, 
but are independent of the amounts of win. This one-dimensional, 
probability-only strategy reappears in the analysis of variance of Table 4.2: 
The mean square for probability is very large compared to the error mean 
square, showing a highly significant probability effect, while the payoff effect 
does not approach significance. 
TABLE 4.1 
Rating Data for Three Subjects Selected to Illustrate Three Response Strategies, Study 1 
Probability x Payoff Levels 
.1 .5 .9 
Strategy 5 25 45 5 25 45 5 25 45 
Payoff only 3,1 11,11 20,20 2,1 11,11 20,20 3,1 11,11 20,20 
Probability only 1,5 2,4 5,4 15,17 15,17 17,17 17,20 20,20 20,20 
Payoff + 3,5 7,6 8,9 10,9 12,16 17,16 13,11 18,19 20,20 
Probability 
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TABLE 4.2 
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Three Selected Subjects, Study 1 
Mean Square 
Payoff Probability Payoff + 
Source dJ Only Only Probability 
Replications I 1.4 8.0 .5 
Probability 2 .1 430.7 171.5 
Payoff 2 495.1 2.7 66.5 
Interaction 4 .I .5 2.5 
Error 8 .4 1.4 1.8 
The child in the last row of Table 4.1 utilized both stimulus factors in a 
probability + payoff strategy. This two-dimensional, probability + payoff 
strategy reappears in the analysis of variance of Table 4.2: The mean squares 
for both factorial effects are considerably large compared to the error mean 
square. This means that this child took account of both factors in making his 
judgment. By virtue of the logic of functional measurement, the 
nonsignificant interaction implies that these two stimulus dimensions were 
integrated by an adding-type rule. 
The next step in the analysis is to relate the response strategies in the rating 
task to the behavior in the choice task. Table 4.3 correlates these rating 
strategies with the choice behavior of the children in the first three-alternative 
decision task. Table 4.3 shows that nearly one-half of those children who 
chose the alternative with the highest or the lowest payoff used a one-
TABLE 4.3 
Attributes of Alternatives in Choice Task and Subjects Cross-
Classified by Behavior in Rating Task and Choice Task 
Alternative 
Dimension A B C 
Probability .I .5 .9 
Payoff value 25 15 5 
Expected value 2.5 7.5 4.5 
Rating Task Classification Number oJ SubjectsQ 
Two-dimensional subjects 5 14 7 
One~imensional subjects 7 0 9 
QEntries indicate number of subjects who chose the given alternative in the 
first choice trial. 
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dimensional response strategy. Contrarily, all subjects who chose the 
alternative with the medium payoff in that choice task employed a 
probability + payoff response strategy in the rating tasks, x2(2) = 12.92, 
P < .001. 
All the one-dimensional subjects who chose the alternative with the highest 
payoff had just the factor "payoff' significant. Similarly, all the one-
dimensional subjects who chose the alternative with the highest probability 
had just the factor "probability" significant. 
In summary, Study 1 showed that the children who chose the alternative 
with the intermediate attribute levels differ in their rating behavior from the 
children who chose other alternatives. In accord with Schmidt's conclusions, 
they were able to combine the two attributes of single, simple bets in their 
judgments. Also, if a child significantly responded in the rating task to only 
the probability (payoff) factor, then he or she chose the alternative with the 
highest probability (payoff). However, some children who chose the 
alternative with the highest payoff or with the highest probability were 
actually able to combine probabilities and payoffs. This result does not fit 
into the framework of three developmental stages of decision making as given 
by Schmidt (1966). 
STUDY 2 
Problem 
One might regard the integration of information present in a single alternative 
as a complete elucidation of children's information processing in decision 
making. This view is adequate only if choices among two or more alternatives 
depend on the rank order of subjective values obtained from the rating of 
single bets alone. But as Tversky (1972) showed with adolescents, the number 
and the similarity of the presented alternatives can have important influences 
on choices. Thus, the set of alternatives presented to the children may affect 
their decision making in two ways. First, there may be an influence of the 
presented number of alternatives on their choices. Second, there may be an 
effect of the similarity I of the alternatives on their choices. Study 2 examines 
whether these aspects of a specified set of alternatives have an effect on 
children's choice probabilities of the alternatives. 
I Let (p Iv) denote the attributes of an alternative, then a similarity pattern ofthree alternatives 
may consist within the set (.1/45), (.2/40), (.9/5), where thefirst two alternatives are apparently 
similar. But that apparent similarity would vanish in the set (.1/45), (.2/10), and (.9/5). So, a 
similarity pattern exists in a set of three alternatives when a difference in the distances of one 
attribute across adjacent alternatives is not compensated by a contrary pattern in the distances of 
the other attribute. 
4. CHILDREN'S CHOICES AMONG BETS 105 
Method 
A 2 x 2 design was used with two sets of alternatives and two response modes 
as factors. By employing two sets of alternatives, the effects of the presented 
number of alternatives and of the similarity within each set on the choice 
probabilities were studied. The two response modes were used to assess the 
choice probabilities because each ofthem seemed desirable to answer certain 
questions. 
The influence of the presented number of alternatives was examined by 
comparing the choice behavior in two-alternative decision tasks with that in a 
three-alternative decision task, all of them derived from the same total set of 
three alternatives. The elements of each set were combined to obtain three 
two-alternative and one three-alternative task. Thus, eight decision tasks 
were derived from the two sets of alternatives that are listed in Table 4.4. Each 
task was presented as a colored picture of two or three bags in the same 
manner as in Study 1. Each bag represented an alternative option for the 
child. 
The influence of the similarity of the alternatives was investigated by 
comparing behavior of two sets of choice tasks that differ in their apparent 
similarity of the three alternatives. Probabilities and payoffs for Set I define 
the similarity pattern so that the pair of alternatives Band C (see Table 4.4) is 
more similar than the pair A and B or the pair A and C. Set 11 was constructed 
so that no apparent similarity of alternatives appears. 
Assessment of the choice probabilities was done in two ways, both of which 
have possible objections. One could obtain repeated choices, either within 
one session or distributed over several sessions. Repetition over several 
sessions would allow possible developmental changes during and between 
sessions. Therefore, repeated choices during one session were obtained to 
assess the choice probabilities. But repeated choices during one session could 
produce boredom, especially with children. As boredom could presumably be 
prevented thereby, payoffs were given after each decision depending on the 
outcome. 
But, giving payoffs could change prior probabilities of choice. Thus, a 
second mode, "distributing choices in advance," was applied. With this 
TABLE 4.4 
Sets of Alternatives from Which Eight Decision Tasks Were Derived 
Set I Set 11 
Alternatives Alternatives 
Win A B C A B C 
Probability .1 .4 .6 .J .5 .9 
Payoff (Pfennigs) 35 12 8 45 25 5 
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procedure, one had to assume that, if several choices were to be made in 
advance for each task, they would picture actual choice probabilities of 
children's single decisions. Unfortunately, no empirical support for this 
assumption was available. Thus, both response modes were used as no one 
other approach was found to be more suitable. 
Thirty-seven children (18 male) aged 8 to 15 years (mean age 11-8) were 
tested in a summer camp. As a pretest, the children were presented with a 
three-alternative task that had equal expected-value alternatives. The 
probabilities of this task were .10, .50, and .90. The payoffs were in the same 
order as the probabilities, 45, 9, and 5 Deutsche Pfennigs. 
After the pretest, subjects made hypothetical advance choices for each of 
the eight tasks. They were asked to indicate in advance how often they would 
choose each alternative when they had 10 choices in each task during the 
session. Following this, they were given a sequence of 10 choices on each of 
the eight tasks. Each such choice was implemented by the child's placing a 
hand into a bag filled with marbles in the same proportion as the chosen 
alternative and making a blind draw of one marble. Win received immediate 
payoff. The same order of tasks was used for all the children and all 10 
replications per subject. 
Results 
Level of Decision Making. In the pretest, 24 subjects chose the alternative 
with medium payoff. Also, in the 10 single choices, 29 subjects chose this 
alternative most frequently. Therefore, a majority of the children are 
considered to be decision makers who were able to consider the expected 
value of an alternative or at least both pieces of information presented in each 
alternative. 
Probabilistic Decision Making. For each child, two sets of choice 
probability estimates were available from advance hypothetical and actual 
single choices. If the decision making of the children was not probabilistic, 
one would expect choice frequencies of 0 or 10 within each set of estimates. 
Table 4.5 shows the frequencies of modal choice probabilities in the three-
alternatives tasks for each set and each response mode. Probabilistic decision 
making implies high frequencies in the upper rows of Table 4.5 corresponding 
to near-chance probabilities. Table 4.5 indicates that the majority of subjects 
made decisions probabilistically with both response modes in both sets. This 
might suggest that one of the response modes assessed the actual choice 
probabilities of single decisions. This conclusion can be justified as follows. In 
Set 11, the optimal strategy with 10 choices would be to choose always the 
medium alternative that has the largest expected value. This can be true only 
of subjects who consider the expected value in their choices. But although the 
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TABLE 4.5 
Frequencies of Modal Choice Probabilities, Three-Alternative TasK, 
Study 2 
Hypothetical Single Choices 
Choices in Advance with Immediate Payoff 
Choice 
Probabilities Set I Set II Set I Set II 
.4 16 12 3 I 
.5 15 11 4 2 
.6 4 6 10 6 
.7 0 4 9 8 
.8 0 0 5 3 
.9 0 0 5 10 
1.0 2 4 7 
pretest results indicate that most of the subjects seem to be able to do that, the 
majority of them behaved probabilistically when several choices among the 
same alternatives were available. 
Influence of Number of Alternatives. Two mathematical conditions were 
examined to test the influence of the presented number of alternatives. Let T 
denote a set of three alternatives. Let P(x;y) be the binary choice pro bability of 
x when presented together withy, and P(x, 1) be the trinary choice probability 
when x is presented together withy and a third alternative. If the addition of a 
third alternative does not change the order of choice probabilities (order 
independence), condition (1) holds (see Tversky, 1972, p. 282). 
For each pair x,y, E T. p(x;y) ;::: .5 if and only p(x,T) ;::: p(y, T) [P(y,T) ¥- 0].(1) 
If the addition of a third alternative did not change the ratio of choice 
probabilities (ratio independence), condition (2) holds (see Tversky, 1972, p. 
292). 
For each pair x,y, E T. P(X;y)j P(y;x) = p(x,T)j p(y, T) [P(y;x) ¥- 0 ¥- P(y,T)].(2) 
Table 4.6 shows how many subjects matched the ratio or order 
independence conditions. Order independence was found in a majority of 
subjects, especially in the real single choices. However, ratio independence 
was almost completely absent. Furthermore, the hypothetical advance 
choices showed less order independence than the real choices. 
Overall, therefore, these data indicate, on an individual level of analysis, 
that the response modes of hypothetical choices in advance and of repeated 
real single choices with immediate payoffs did not yield choice probability 
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TABLE 4.6 
Frequencies of Children (n = 37) Who Fit Order or Ratio 
Independence 
Set I Set II 
Mode Order Ratio Order Ratio 
Hypothetical 
choices 21 I 19 2 
Single choices 31 0 29 5 
estimates that are independent of adding a third alternative. Although the 
majority of children showed order independence, some subjects showed order 
dependence. This suggests that children's choice behavior in two-alternative 
tasks might differ from that in three-alternative tasks, as the enlargement of 
the presented number of alternatives can change even the order of choice 
probabilities. 
Group Analysis of Ratio Independence. The individual analyses of ratio 
independence in Table 4.6 might not have adequate sensitivity. Accordingly, 
it seems justified to examine ratio independence on a group level. For each 
subject, therefore, the individual deviation d = p(x;y) - p(x, T)/[p(x, T) + 
Ry, T)] was calculated for each pair x,y. The observed mean cl was tested 
against the expectation E(di) = 0, which should hold if ratio independence 
holds because condition (3) then becomes an equality. 
The analysis of variance showed no significant effects. The overall mean 
was cl = .015. The estimated standard deviation was .011, yielding z = 1.38. 
Although cl is not significantly different from 0, this z-value indicates that 
even the group data reflect the influence of the third alternative on the choice 
probabilities. To understand that conclusion, one should imagine first that, 
although the d of two pairs of one individual su bject were positive, the third d 
need not be, and second, that the individual analysis showed that individuals 
might differ in which of their d pairs are positive. Both circumstances reduce 
the z-value of d. Thus, the influence of adding a third alternative was 
almost strong enough to be revealed as a trend in the group data analysis. 
Influence of Similarity Perception. Similarity of alternatives with 
medium and highest probability (see Table 4.4) was systematically high in Set 
I. If children take into consideration this similarity, then condition (3) should 
hold (see Tversky, 1972, p. 292). 
P(B;A) > P(B, T)/[P(B, T) + P(A, T)J and 
P(C;A) > P(C,T)/[p(C,T) + p(A,T»). (3) 
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This condition can be justified intuitively by the argument that, if an 
alternative is added that is similar to only one of two already existing 
alternatives, then it will subtract more from the choice probability for the 
similar alternative than for the dissimilar alternative. 
Perceived similarity need not be bound to the objective similarity that has 
been arranged in Set I. Children may perceive alternatives A and B or 
alternatives A and C to be equally similar. These three similarity pairs must be 
considered separately. This argument can be applied to Set 11 as well. 
The children's choice probabilities were analyzed with regard to how often 
condition (3) was supported in each possible similarity pair. Table 4.7 shows 
the frequencies of children to whom one of the three similarity perceptions 
could be attributed. If the similarity manipulation influenced the individual 
children, one would expect that the entry in row BC of Set I would be higher 
than the other entries of the same set and higher than the entry BC in Set 11. As 
can be seen, this expectation was not supported. The real single choices show 
a strong disagreement with expectation. 
It is difficult to estimate the chance probability of an entry in Table 4.7. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that a verification of one part of 
condition (3) is as pro bable as a falsification, if similarity plays no role in the 
decision process. This assumption implies a probability of .25 in each of the 
four rows. Testing the observed frequencies against this expectation yielded 
only one significant chi-square (see Table 4.7). Because this one significant 
chi-square partly results from an overly high frequency of "no similarity" 
judgments, it clearly does not support the similarity hypothesis. 
Two further tests for similarity effects were also performed. The first 
sought for a more sensitive index by comparing attributed similarities across 
Sets I and 11. The second extended the first by allowing for some within-
subject variability within each of Sets I and 11. Neither test provided any sign 
TABLE 4.7 
Frequencies of Children Satisfying the Perceived Similarity 
Assumptions, Study 2 
Hypothetical Choices Single Choices 
Similarity 
Assumed Between Set I Set Il Set I Set Il 
A B 5 8 8 3 
B C 12 8 9 15 
A C 10 5 9 4 
No similarity 10 16 11 15 
i (df= 3) 2.89 7.22 .51 14.35" 
"p < .05. 
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of similarity effect. Overall, therefore, these data provide no support for the 
hypothesis that similarity affected the children's choices. 
DISCUSSION 
Developmental Stages 
The results of Study I, obtained by the combined use of choice and rating 
responses, helped illustrate the information processing hypotheses of the 
three developmental stages found by Schmidt (1966). The children who chose 
the alternative with the highest payoff and also employed a payoff-only 
strategy in their rating responses represent information processing of the first 
developmental stage. These children seem to be unaware or to lack 
understanding of the "probability" attribute of the alternatives. 
The second developmental stage was described by Schmidt (1966) as 
transitional, in which subjects consider only the probability of the 
alternatives. In the present study, those subjects who chose the alternative 
with the largest probability and also employed a probability-only rating 
strategy would seem to correspond to Schmidt's transition stage subjects. 
In Schmidt's third developmental stage, subjects are considered to combine 
the payoff and probability attributes when choosing the medium alternative. 
Subjects at this stage were found in the present study too. Indeed, all those 
subjects who chose the alternative with medium attribute values appeared to 
use a probability + payoff strategy in their ratings. These three groups, 
defined in terms of choice and rating behavior, seem to accord with Schmidt's 
three-stage hypothesis. 
However, there were two other groups of children who did not fit into 
Schmidt's three stages. This can be seen in the cross-classification of choice 
and rating strategies given in the lower part ofTable4.3. The 14 children who 
chose the medium alternative were not the only ones who employed the two-
dimensional probability + payoff rating strategy. Five children who chose on 
the basis of payoff and seven who chose on the basis of probability also used 
the two-dimensional probability + payoff strategy in their ratings. The 
information processing of these children differs from that in Schmidt's stage 
descriptions. The present results suggest, therefore, that Schmidt's three-
stage classification is not sufficient and that other stages exist. 
In addition, it is necessary to consider a fourth, more advanced stage not 
considered by Schmidt. This stage could be characterized by the ability to 
combine attributes according to a multiplying rule when making decisions 
and judgments. This fourth stage would be consistent with previous studies of 
the present author (Hommers 1975, 1976), in which children who chose the 
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medium alternative appeared to be sensitive to the expected value of an 
alternative, that is, to the product of payoff and probability. 
In this hypothesis of four developmental stages, the first two would appear 
as described by Schmidt. These are one-dimensional subjects; they take 
account of just one attribute of the bets. The other two stages are two-
dimensional, but differ in their integration rule. The third stage might be 
characterized mainly by its probability + payoff rating strategy, in which the 
choice behavior depends on the weights of the attributes. At the fourth stage 
the subjects might employ a mUltiplying rule in their ratings. This would 
reveal itself in the choice task as following a maximization of expected value 
rule. 
Individual Bayesian Analysis of Choices 
Wendt (1973, 1975) suggested a Bayesian technique to compare competing 
probabilistic models of the information processing of nondominated 
alternative bets. Two formal models were proposed: The constant-ratio 
model, and the sum-difference model. 
The constant-ratio model assumes that the alternatives can be scaled so that 
choice probability ratios are independent of the number of presented 
alternatives. However, the results of the present Study II showed that ratio 
independence did not hold. This result indicates that the constant-ratio model 
is not valid for children's choices. 
The sum-difference model requires that the highest choice probability 
among three alternatives is not greater than one-half. Table 4.5 shows that 
this condition failed for nearly all subjects with real choices and for at least 
some subjects with hypothetical choices. Additionally, the sum-difference 
model requires order independence. But, in both response modes, some 
subjects failed this condition. Thus, the validity of the sum-difference model 
for children's choices is also doubtful. 
Power of the Functional Measurement Approach 
The power of the functional measurement approach for the understanding of 
the development of decision making is demonstrated by the results of Study 1 
in several respects. These data confirmed earlier results, but allowed a more 
penetrating analysis. Subjects who chose the medium alternative, in fact, 
combine the probability and payoff cues. Also, children who did not integrate 
probability and payoff in the rating task did not chose the alternative with 
medium attributes in the choice task. But most importantly, the power of the 
combined use of factorial design and rating response was shown by the result 
that the choice behavior of some children was observed together with a two-
dimensional rating strategy. Previously, children who chose the alternative 
• 
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with either the highest payoff or the highest probability were not regarded as 
capable to consider both attributes ofthe bets simultaneously. This view was 
based on the choices. But, by the use of the functional measurement 
approach, it could be shown that they are, in fact, capable of integrating these 
attributes. 
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